Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider by Rothenberg, Karen H.
KAREN H. ROTHENBERG 
Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider* 
Medical advances in new reproductive technologies continue to raise complex 
legal and ethical issues. In October 1990, a California Superior Court judge 
issued his opinion on the first contested case in this country involving gesta-
tional surrogacy. 1 Upholding the surrogacy contract as valid and declaring 
that the genetic parents had exclusive custody and parental rights, Judge 
Richard Parslow observed: "The IVF genie is out of the bottle and you're 
not going to be able to put it back."2 
I contend that we must put part of the genie back into the bottle. Gestational 
surrogacy is not an acceptable option for the extension of in vitro fertiliza-
tion (IVF). This is not a reaction to the facts of the California case, but rather 
a recognition that the medicalization of surrogacy as a reproductive technology 
attempts to legitimize a practice that professionals should not support. 
Following a brief discussion of Johnson v. Calvert, the California case, I 
will summarize the status of U.S. and international laws and policies on sur-
rogacy, with particular attention on gestational surrogacy. I will also discuss 
ethical positions on surrogacy issued by organizations of health care profes-
sionals. With this background established, I will outline my position on why 
the ethical and legal risks inherent in gestational surrogacy ... require 
professionals to reject it as a reproductive alternative. 
JOHNSON V. CALVERT 
Crispina Calvert, who had had a hysterectomy, worked as a registered nurse 
in the same hospital as Anna Johnson, an ex-Marine and licensed vocational 
nurse. A mutual friend introduced them, believing that Anna wanted to be a 
surrogate. Anna was black and a single parent of a three-year-old girl. She 
had had two prior miscarriages and two stillbirths. Crispina was Filipino and 
her husband, Mark, was white. The Calverts claimed that they could not afford 
to go to a surrogacy agency, but paid $3,500 for the agency's standard contract 
and some legal advice. Johnson signed the contract. 3 
It is unclear whether Anna was ever screened as an "appropriate" 
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surrogate. Crispina and Anna both began hormonal therapy to mesh their 
ovulation cycles. Crispina had a number of eggs removed and fertilized with 
Mark's sperm, and three were transferred into Anna. Against the odds, one 
embryo implanted. For weeks, Anna received hormonal injections to maximize 
her chances of maintaining the pregnancy. She was hospitalized more than 
once for complications during the pregnancy. She was also advised to seek 
psychiatric help for emotional problems:~ 
The deal seemed to be working. Anna would receive $10,000 for her 
gestational services and for relinquishing the baby, the Calverts would have 
a genetic child, and the IVF program would contribute to another expansion 
of IVF for women who would otherwise not be able to benefit from such 
technology. But Anna, for whatever reason, changed her mind, and the deal 
began to fall apart. Seeking to invalidate the contract, she claimed among other 
things that she had bonded with the fetus and sought the court's protection 
of her future parental rights. Unwilling to recognize the possibility of three 
parents and Anna's role as the gestational mother (and probably doubting 
her claim that she had, in fact, bonded), the judge declared the contract valid 
and granted full and exclusive custody to the Calverts.5 Anna Johnson filed 
an appeal on October 24, 1990.6 
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICIES ON SURROGACY 
Since the Baby M case made headlines a few years ago, policies on surro-
gacy continue to evolve around the world. 7 In the United States, legislation 
has been introduced in Congress and in thirty-nine states, as well as the District 
of Columbia, to deal with various aspects of commercial surrogacy.8 To 
date, only thirteen states have passed laws dealing with surrogate parenting 
contracts and their legality. Eleven states have either declared commercial 
surrogacy illegal and/or made it impossible to enforce a contract as contrary 
to public policy.9 A few of these states specifically include g~stational 
surrogacy within their definitional sections. 10 Arkansas allows for ·a birth 
certificate to be changed to recognize that the intended mother rather than 
the surrogate is the legal mother, but is vague about the parameters of the 
legality of surrogacy.11 New Hampshire's recent statute permits, but with 
extensive regulation and pre-approval by the court, both forms of surrogacy. 12 
No statute gives more rights to the surrogate with a genetic connection than 
to the gestational surrogate. 13 
Bioethical task forces in both New Jersey and New York have also rec-
ommended that surrogacy not be allowed, particularly in the commercial 
setting, and that the surrogate be given the right to keep the child. 14 In fact, 
the New Jersey Task Force recommends that it be criminal for professionals 
to participate in commercial surrogacy. The prohibition can subject the 
professional to a charge of unprofessional conduct and prosecution.15 Such 
participation in surrogacy might include screening of candidates and 
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performing artificial insemination and embryo transfer with a gestational 
surrogate. 
The most recent survey of international laws and policies clearly establishes 
that surrogacy contracts, especially if commercial, are illegal, unenforceable, 
contrary to public policy and/or void. 16 Furthermore, most laws establish that 
the birth mother is deemed the legal mother. 17 
Of particular interest, Bulgaria declares that motherhood is determined by 
birth, whether or not conception is with another's genetic material. 18 Israeli 
regulations establish that a fertilized egg may be implanted only in the intended 
mother.19 In Norway and Sweden, a fertilized egg may only be placed back 
into the woman from which the egg was removed. 20 In Spain, surrogacy with 
or without money is null and void, but if there is a contract for gestation, it 
declares that the mother who gave birth is still the mother.21 The United 
Kingdom bans commercial surrogacy agencies from engaging women to act 
as su~TQgate mothers/2 and the German parliament just passed a law banning 
both surrogate motherhood and embryo transfer. 23 
The Council of Europe has declared that "maternity should be determined 
by the fact of giving birth, rather than genetics (origin of the ova), firstly 
because of the relationship between the child and the woman giving birth to 
him and, secondly, because of the necessity of giving the child a clear legal 
situation at birth."24 Furthermore, absent an exceptional case, surrogate 
motherhood should be banned and such contracts should be deemed null and 
void. 25 The council cautions that physicians should be prohibited from bringing 
together an infertile couple and a surrogate mother.26 
Health-professional organizations both in the United States and abroad have 
also taken positions. The American Medical Association in December of 
1988 incorporated its earlier report on surrogacy into the official opinions of 
its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Whether genetic or gestational, 
the opinion states that surrogacy "does not represent a satisfactory reproduc-
tive alternative for people who wish to become parents.'m This past June, 
the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society also reissued, with 
minor changes, its position recommending that surrogacy and gestational sur-
rogacy be continued only as a "clinical experiment".28 The Committee on Ethics 
of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) just issued 
its revised opinion in "Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood."29 The com-
mittee found that the surrogate who both carries the fetus and delivers the infant 
should be the sole source of consent for all questions regarding prenatal care 
and delivery, and that she should have a specified time after birth to decide 
whether or not to place the child for adoption with the commissioning couple. 
The opinion specifically addresses, in part, gestational surrogacy and recog-
nizes that while the genetic link to the couple is important, it deems it "less 
weighty than the link between the surrogate mother and the fetus or infant 
that is created through gestation and birth.''30 Thus, the opinion makes no 
ethical distinction between what it describes as "the usual pattern of surro-
gate parenting and surrogate gestational motherhood.'' 31 
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The ACOG committee further states that the physician, when approached, 
should assure all disclosure of medical and ethical risk and that the provider 
may justifiably decline participating in a surrogacy arrangement. If the 
physician does agree to participate, strict ethical guidelines should be followed. 
Of particular interest is that the surrogate and the commissioning couple should 
be regarded as distinct parties and should be separately represented, both 
medically and legally. 32 
In August 1990, the Working Party on Human Infertility Services of the 
British Medical Association (BMA) adopted extensive ethical guidelines on 
surrogacyY These guidelines supersede a 1987 ruling that doctors should 
not take part in surrogacy arrangements until the BMA had agreed upon ethical 
controls. 34 The BMA guidelines warn physicians that surrogacy arrangements 
are unenforceable in law and that neither of the parties can be prevented 
from breach. 35 The guidelines provide that surrogacy be a last resort, that 
' doctors consider as surrogates only those women who have a partner and 
already have one child. Physicians should also warn the commissioning couple, 
the surrogate, and her partner of all risks (which the BMA outlines in great 
detail), including the possibility that the surrogate may refuse to relinquish 
the child and that the commissioning couple may refuse to accept a child 
born with any defects. 36 The Working Party makes no ethical or legal distinction 
between "partial" (genetic) and "full" (gestational) surrogacy. In fact, they note 
that "whatever the genetic origins of a child, and regardless of the wishes of 
the participants, the law regards the child as belonging to the mother who deliv-
ered it."37 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and the British Medical 
Association both have accepted the political reality that infertility specialists 
fear restrictions on their practice. In fact, some IVF programs are part of the 
created demand for legalized surrogacy. Surrogacy in this medical context 
reduces gestation to a technological tool. This is understandable, considering 
the increasing expectation of the couple believing that with enough technology 
anyone can have a baby. 
At the same time this medicalization reduces the role played by the ges-
tational mother in the creation of life. The surrogate is deemed to be making 
a healthy adjustment if she remains unconnected - the most unnatural of 
feelings. This is too great a risk for health care professionals to contribute 
to reducing women to extensions of a medical process. 
Furthermore, as an international matter, gestational surrogacy has the 
potential to exploit poor women from Third World countries, perhaps raising 
the false hope of immigration to the United States. Rich white couples, in turn, 
desperate for a genetic connection, can use poor women to achieve the result. 
Health care professionals cannot condone using women in this way. 
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I would strongly urge that health professionals resist any support of the 
use of a gestational surrogate. Obviously we all want to satisfy the infertile 
couple with the option of IVF. But we have to set limits when another woman, 
also being treated as a unit by the IVF program, is involved. We are pitting 
mothers against each other, and the health care provider is potentially in the 
middle of the conflict. The right law, the right contract, and the right coun-
seling will not be able to correct the problems with gestational surrogacy. 
I do not make this argument in defense of Anna Johnson, or in reaction 
to that case. Although I am surprised that we have not seen more cases to 
date, they will come, and the health care provider will be in a no-win position. 38 
Let me highlight the specific issues that gestational surrogacy poses for the 
health care professional throughout the process. 
Screening 
PropOnents of surrogacy believe that with enough screening by qualified 
professionals, surrogacy can be a success. The recent New Hampshire statute,39 
in fact, provides for professional screening of both the couple and the 
surrogate to assure a court in a pre-approval process that the contract will work. 
Yet what are we screening for? 
For example, how does a psychologist assess whether a gestational 
surrogate is a good risk?40 If she is less willing to want to bond because 
there is no genetic connection, will she remain this way throughout the 
gestational process? And what if she continues to feel removed, because 
there is no genetic connection? Will this influence her prenatal behavior to 
make her a bad risk and a noncompliant patient? The data does not exist to 
develop the perfect profile of the surrogate and the commissioning couple who 
can cope with IVF and embryo transfer. What are the measures of motiva-
tion, self-esteem, family support, and experience in coping with childbearing 
loss? What relationship will the genetic and the gestational mother have to 
each other? What perception does the surrogate have of the father and the future 
of a unit relationship? Certainly we do not have experience with genetic parents 
dealing with loss to the gestational mother. 
We do have some experience that supports the possibility of motivation 
to deny or omit feelings and relevant medical information. And there may 
be unconscious motivation not to hear or appreciate all the risks when the 
motivation is so strong for both the couple and the IVF program to achieve 
a pregnancy, and for the surrogate to be successful and to be paid. 
In the first medical malpractice case filed that involved the treatment of a 
surrogate, Mounce v. Hanson, 41 the surrogate admitted to the physician who 
took her medical history that she had had two prior miscarriages and no live 
births. She was not screened out. Perhaps more important, she did not state 
that she had had a history of heart trouble. She was desperate to serve as a 
surrogate, perhaps as a way to deal with her prior losses, and to make some 
money. In her eighth month of pregnancy, she died of heart failure following 
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a number of warning signals, and the baby died too. The sperm donor never 
came forward, but her family has sued Genesearch, the surrogacy program, 
the physician who screened her and provided her prenatal care, and the 
consulting cardiologist. 42 
The Calverts claimed that Anna Johnson also failed to provide important 
medical information, in not revealing her two miscarriages and two stillbirths.43 
Clearly, she was not an ideal candidate, either medically or psychologically, 
for surrogacy. When money is involved, and when we all want something 
bad enough, screening may be of limited use without all the facts. And even 
if we think we have all the facts, we have to decide which facts are the ones 
that matter. 
Thus, in spite of the call for screening to assure that the arrangement has 
the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, the process is flawed. First of all, 
we have no consensus on what we are screening for. Medically, what are the 
. -:-standards for an acceptable surrogate? The existence of a uterus and a willing 
carrier are not enough. Rather, I would argue that at the present time an 
infertile couple is not a candidate for IVF if the woman is not able to be the 
birth mother. As noted earlier, Norway, Sweden and Israel require that IVF 
be allowed only if the woman is implanted with her own genetic material. 44 
Secondly, we do not know what the acceptable psychological profile is 
for a low risk couple and surrogate. And finally, professionals are not 
qualified to determine what information is meaningful. The ethical and legal, 
not to mention medical and psychological, risks are not clear, and by defini-
tion, they may never be. 
Informed Consent 
Assuming that both the couple and the surrogate pass the screening require-
ments, an elaborate informed consent process is to follow. ACOG, for example, 
recommends that the medical and the ethical risks be carefully spelled out 
to the couple and the surrogate.45 The New Hampshire statute also requires 
an extensive evaluation, counseling, and an informed consent process.46 But 
are health care providers qualified to do the job? And do they have enough 
information to make the process meaningful? How does a gestational surro-
gate consent knowingly to relinquishment of a future child? She may have 
experienced a birth, but is it easier or harder to relinquish if you have no genetic 
connection? Is the lack of a genetic connection relevant at all? Obviously, 
genetics matter to the couple, who may feel more strongly about losing their 
wholly genetic child. 
In fact, how does a provider describe the ethical and legal risks? Fewer 
than a quarter of the states have laws that either hold surrogacy contracts 
unenforceable or heavily regulate them.47 Under traditional family law, rather 
than contract law, the birth mother is the mother. Yet, in Johnson v. Calven 
the lower court in California found that genetics is all that matters, and the 
gestational mother has no rights.48 
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Clearly, informed consent based on legal risks is risky at best. There are 
no guarantees. Nor are there any guarantees with respect to psychological 
risk for the couple, the surrogate, or the surrogate's family. Medically, there 
are unknown long-term risks associated with fertility drugs, IVF procedures, 
risk to the child, and risks to the gestational surrogate from multiple gesta-
tion. Obviously, the medical risks are more significant for the gestational 
surrogate than for the surrogate who is artificially inseminated and usually 
carries just a single fetus to term. Again, it is one thing to risk your own 
body. It is quite another to achieve "voluntary" consent to experiment with 
another woman's body for the couple's benefit. 
Conflict of Interest and the Embryo Transfer 
Assu~ing some form of informed consent is attempted, there still remain 
problems with the conflict of interest inherent in an IVF program promoting 
embryo transfer with a gestational surrogate. The couple and their surrogate 
are treated like a unit with the same interest - the achievement of a 
successful pregnancy. The client, however, is not the surrogate but the paying 
couple. The surrogate is needed to allow the provider to extend the potential 
of IVF use into a "uterine carrier." The surrogate is a means to an end. How 
can the physician maintain a confidential relationship with two women who 
are both potential mothers of the same baby or babies? 
Furthermore, the medical risks are significant for both the genetic and 
gestational mother. First, their ovulatory cycles must coincide. Drugs are 
necessary to manipulate their cycles. Fertility drugs also may help to stimu-
late the production of eggs by the genetic mother-to-be so that a number of 
eggs can be retrieved. The husband's sperm is then combined with the eggs, 
and any resulting embryos are transferred into the gestational surrogate. The 
surrogate continues to receive hormonal injections for a number of weeks to 
maximize the chances of a successful implantation and pregnancy. The IVF 
program has a responsibility for the well-being of all members of this unit. 
This is a risky business. Once the IVF process is finished, the IVF program 
may think its job is over. A pregnancy (or pregnancies) has been achieved, 
yet there is potential for future maternal morbidity and mortality for both 
mothers-to-be. It is one thing to assume these risks when the genetic mother 
is also to be the host uterus. It is different, however, when there is potential 
for conflict within the unit. In fact, all the parties cannot be treated as a unit. 
They are individual patients, with individual needs, and the provider must avoid 
any appearance of conflict of interest. Yet by definition, IVF and embryo 
transfer with a gestational surrogate is a case of potential conflict of interest. 
The ACOG committee opinion states that conflict of interest must be avoided 
by the use of separate medical providers for infertility and care to the 
surrogate. 49 
For the process to work, will we tolerate inherent conflict which clearly 
favors the interests of the consumers of the IVF technology over the surra-
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gate? Does the IVF provider have, in faCt, a physician-patient relationship with 
the surrogate, or does the provider take the surrogate as a mere extension of 
the procedure? How much responsibility will the IVF program take for 
screening a surrogate? If the surrogate is good enough for the couple, is the 
surrogate good enough for the IVR provider? It is the responsibility of the 
provider to warn the surrogate of all risks, but is this not in conflict with the 
couple's goals and interests? 
The ACOG committee opinion provides that the surrogate is the 
source of all medical decisions with respect to the pregnancy.5° For in fact, 
once the transfer is complete, all biological connections are made by the 
gestational mother-to-be. She is more than a uterine container. 51 She 
provides all the nutrients and bodily functions necessary to make this 
embryo grow into a fetus and then a baby. Clearly the interest of all is in 
her physical and emotional well-being. And any psychological counseling 
- ~ecessary during pregnancy must be directed to doing what is best for the 
pregnant woman. 
Multiple Embryo Transfer 
It is common IVF practice to transfer at least three fertilized embryos. Some 
IVF programs transfer up to six. 52 Obviously, this practice attempts to maximize 
the chances of achieving a pregnancy. However, twins, triplets, and maybe 
more are to be expected. A World Health Organization study on IVF found 
that with the potential for multiple births, maternal morbidity and mortality, 
as well as infant morbidity and mortality, significantly increase. 53 If the genetic 
mother chooses to take this risk with her body, it is one thing. But health 
care professionals should not impose such risks on the gestational surrogate 
whose body is being used for the couple's benefit. 
Multiple gestation and its risks raise problems for gestational surrogacy that 
were not considered with genetic surrogacy, in which single gestation is the 
norm. The risks to all parties, including the liability of the IVF physician, 
increase. It is more likely that the gestational surrogate will become a high risk 
pregnancy, will require a cesarean section delivery, will have more compli-
cations and more monitoring, and will be unable to continue working 
throughout the pregnancy. And how do we then compensate fairly for this 
additional burden of gestational service and for relinquishing more than one 
baby? 
Obviously the potential conflict of interest for the IVF provider is raised 
again. Just how many embryos should be transferred? On the one hand, 
selective termination of the "extra" fetuses might be the answer for the genetic 
couple.54 But what about the surrogate's view? Perhaps she will not want to 
abort and will risk carrying three or four to term. Of course, this decision 
also raises the risk to her and the fetuses. 
Ultimately, if the gestational surrogate is the decisionmaker for medical care, 
she and not the genetic couple must decide what is best for her health and 
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the health of the fetuses, including selective termination of pregnancy. This 
is not to say that the couple and provider will not exert pressure on her. 
Prenatal Diagnosis and Genetic Testing 
A standard surrogate contract will require the surrogate to undergo genetic 
testing, including amniocentesis, to establish whether or not there are any 
genetic or chromosomal abnormalities. Yet is this not a strange requirement 
for the gestational surrogate? The gestational surrogate is not the genetic carrier 
of the problems being screened for. Obviously genetic counseling has no 
function for her. Such counseling is relevant to the genetic couple, but it is 
the surrogate who is subjecting herself to the testing. Once again she would 
have the right not to abort a defective fetus, but if the couple then rejects 
the fetus, who gets the child? Unless the surrogate chooses to keep the child 
with ne genetic link to her, the child may become a ward of the state. What 
if she does choose to abort the fetus, because she does not want to carry a 
"defective" pregnancy, and the couple still wants the pregnancy to continue? 
It is the couple's genetic material, and they are willing to accept the result. 
Yet, if they desire the surrogate to have genetic testing, it would seem that 
the couple would have to accept her decision to abort. Regardless of the result, 
the use of genetic testing with gestational surrogates raises unique ethical 
and legal challenges for the provider. 
Control of Behavioral Lifestyle and Work Environment 
In addition to genetic testing, surrogate contracts often require that surro-
gates do not drink, smoke, or take illicit drugs. Obviously enforcement of such 
provisions is problematic. Such provisions require that the physician take on 
the role of spy rather than fiduciary toward the patient. In fact, the ACOG 
committee opinion clearly provides that the confidential relationship remains 
with the surrogate. 55 
However, with gestational surrogacy it would seem that the couple, 
and perhaps the physician, will feel more a hold on the gestational 
surrogate. Since she has no genetic connection to the pregnancy, they may fear 
she will be less concerned with taking care of herself and the fetus. There have 
been cases in which health care providers have gone to court to try to force 
certain treatments or cesarean section deliveries.56 A couple, with the support 
of the provider, having invested so much time, emotional energy, and money 
in achieving a pregnancy, may feel they have no recourse other than to go 
to court to protect their genetic material from the negative behaviors of the 
surrogate. The couple might try to argue that their intention to rear the child, 
as well as the force of the contract, gives them legal standing to seek an 
injunction to get the surrogate to undergo a medical procedure or to stop 
smoking, drinking, or taking drugs during the pregnancy. It is not clear whether 
the court would be more or less concerned about the autonomy of the pregnant 
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woman to control her own body when she has no intention to rear the child 
and to accept the consequences of her actions. One also wonders what the 
psychological impact of not carrying a genetic fetus has on the acts and 
behavior of the surrogate, as well as on the health of the uterine environ-
ment. If in fact it is easier to separate, is it easier to ignore other concerns 
for the fetus? 
Furthermore, what will be the implications for employment of the surro-
gate? Is gestating her only job? Does she have the right to continue any other 
employment? If she works in a lead factory, must she be forced to be trans-
ferred or fired?57 What if she is having twins and is told "to get off her feet?" 
If she stops working, will the couple pay her lost earnings? Will she be barred 
from disability payments if her pregnancy resulted from an embryo transfer 
for hire? What role will the provider play in helping her to obtain disability 
,ceverage? With the increase in medical risks come increasing economic risks. 
. ' 
Birth Defects and Causation 
Unfortunately, no one can guarantee the birth of a healthy child. With gesta-
tional surrogacy, it may be more difficult to determine the cause of a problem 
at birth. Was it a genetic problem? Was it the surrogate's work environment? 
Was it the one drink? Was it caused by a sexually transmitted disease that 
she caught during relations with her husband? Gestational surrogacy takes 
genetics out of the picture, but it may be difficult to pin the problem on a 
particular cause. In the end, will the couple and/or the surrogate, if she retains 
custody, look to the physician for a financial solution through a liability claim? 
With so much that cannot be controlled in the birth process, and with such 
high expectations and expenses generated from IVF and embryo transfer, a 
liability threat from both the surrogate and commissioning couple should not 
be minimized. 
CONCLUSION 
State courts and legislatures, health-professional organizations, and policy-
makers throughout the world are struggling to develop laws and guidelines 
to address the complex questions raised by the expansion of new reproduc-
tive technologies. Clearly, infertility specialists are sincerely devoted to trying 
to help couples have their own babies. But health care professionals must resist 
the temptation to expand the use of IVF and embryo transfer with gestational 
surrogacy. The medical, ethical, and legal risks of using another woman to 
serve the interests of the infertile couple cannot be minimized. Gestational 
surrogacy is not a cure for infertility, but rather a course to be avoided. 
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